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YOU ARE NOW ENTERING THE SCHOOL ZONE, PROCEED WITH CAUTION:1 EDUCATORS, 
ARBITRATION, & CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
By 
Raquel Muñiz* 
 
“ . . . in serving the best interests of the children, we serve the best interests of all 
humanity.”– Carol Bellamy, Fourth Executive Director of UNICEF 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A survey of cases suggests children’s rights have received minimal attention in the 
public school labor relations context.2 However, children can be the third parties to 
consequences flowing from reinstatement of educators suspended for student-related 
disciplinary matters. Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”) in the primary and 
secondary education field are binding contractual agreements detailing employment terms 
and conditions (including pay, benefits, termination, and leave policies)3 between 
unionized educators (employees) and the school districts (employers).4 Courts have limited 
the scope of what public employees may bargain,5 but procedures regarding employee 
disciplinary matters are generally negotiable under CBAs.6 These procedures, including 
                                                 
1 Colloquial reference to American school zones, in which drivers must drive at a reduced speed limit and 
proceed with caution to avoid harming a child.  
* Raquel Muñiz is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation, a 2018 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law and a Doctoral Candidate at The 
Pennsylvania State University College of Education, Department of Education Policy Studies,  Educational 
Theory and Policy Program. 
2 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
3 See generally Collective Bargaining, AM. FED’N OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUS. ORG., 
http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/Collective-Bargaining (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).  
4 See generally Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N 1, 
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/120701-CBWhatisitandHow-itWorks-3page.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 
2016). 
5 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Dist., 199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (Neb. 1972) (noting that boards should not be  
required to negotiate managerial prerogatives and matters of public policy). 
6 See, e.g., N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. N.J. Tpk. Supervisors Ass’n, 670 A.2d 1, 11 (N.J. 1996) (holding that procedural 
disciplinary measures, including binding arbitration, were negotiable and did not impinge on managerial 
prerogatives). 
arbitration for disciplinary issues, are typically included (and preferred) in private and 
public CBAs between unions and employers.7 
Arbitration of educator disciplinary matters in primary and secondary schools has 
resulted in arbitrators reinstating questionable educators.8 For example, in Colonial 
Intermediate Unit #20 v. Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, Education Association, 
(“Colonial Intermediate Unit”), the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that the arbitrator’s award, reinstating a special education teacher, was 
“rationally derived from the CBA, and . . . did not violate a well-defined, dominant public 
policy.”9 The teacher had a history of humiliating students, calling students names such as 
“loser, sissy, liar, knucklehead, crybaby and chubby butt,”10 twisting the students’ arms, 
placing students in corners for up to three days, pushing their heads, and placing an “I 
Abuse Animals” sign around a student’s neck.11 The Appellate Court found the 
“[a]rbitrator determined [the teacher’s] conduct did not constitute immorality, cruelty, 
persistent negligence, willful violation of Employer’s directives, or willful neglect of 
duties” in violation of the School Code.12 The intermediate unit appealed the decision, but 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the appeal.13 The arbitrator and the lower courts 
in this case did not directly consider the subsequent effects on the students upon 
reinstatement of the teacher.14 While the courts cannot engage in speculation, returning a 
questionable teacher to the classroom may place current and future students at risk. For 
example, a teacher who has difficulty controlling his or her temperament might have an 
outburst against the students upon reinstatement. 
Arbitrators and courts in these types of cases often focus their analysis on the terms 
of the underlying contract, namely the CBA, and other rules and regulations included by 
incorporation.15  In other words, the analysis treats the arbitration of educator discipline 
matters primarily as a traditional contract interpretation case and does not directly weigh 
                                                 
7 See generally A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/basics_papers/nlra/grievance_arbitration.au
thcheckdam.pdf.   
8 See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 v. Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 Educ. Ass’n, No. 839 C.D. 
2014, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 9, 2015). 
9 Id. at *2. 
10 Id. at *5.  
11 Id. at *3-5. 
12 Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *6. 
13 Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 v. Colonial Intermediate Unit #20 Educ. Ass’n, No. 305 MAL 2015, 2015 
Pa. LEXIS 2153, at *1 (Pa. Sept. 29, 2015). 
14 See Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *1. 
15 See id.  
the wellbeing of the students. It is true that, for example, when the arbitrator or court 
considers whether the teacher’s behavior violated public policy or constituted cruelty 
toward children in violation of the governing school code, the arbitrator or court may 
encompass the children’s interest in their analysis.16 However, this is only a vicarious 
incorporation and results only in indirect benefits, if any at all, to the children.17 The 
arbitrator and court are engaging primarily in analysis of substantive contract law 
concerning the employee and employer and do not discuss the children’s wellbeing.  
The fact that children are minors and that schools act in loco parentis during school 
hours,18 warrants a different approach to arbitration in educator discipline cases. For the 
reasons stated above, arbitration of disciplinary matters vis-à-vis primary and secondary 
public school educators is of a different nature than traditional employee-employer 
arbitrable disputes. Public schools should be considered a sui generis category in labor 
relations arbitration. Safeguards should be adopted to directly address the children’s well-
being when determining whether a teacher, suspended for questionable behavior, should 
be reinstated to the classroom. 
This article first provides background information on CBAs and arbitration clauses 
in public employee labor relations contracts to underscore the evolving relationship 
between the employer and employees. This background is important to assess the 
feasibility of the safeguards proposed later. Next, this article will explore arbitration cases 
in school employer-educator union CBAs, focusing particularly on employee disciplinary 
matters. Then, this article will explain why primary and secondary public schools should 
be categorized as a sui generis sphere in which consequences of arbitrable disciplinary 
matters extend beyond the traditional public employer-employee relation. Finally, this 
article will propose workable and sustainable safeguards to protect children’s rights in 
arbitration of educator discipline cases. After all, though not co-extensive with adult rights, 
children have rights, and they do not “shed” them at the “schoolhouse gate.”19  
II. BACKGROUND 
This section presents a brief history of collective bargaining and arbitration clauses 
in CBAs. This information is important because the historical and background information 
provides important context on public employer-employee labor relations. The background 
illustrates the degree of bargaining power that unions and employers have, the self-interests 
both parties bring to the collective bargaining process, and the benefits and limitations both 
parties may derive from collective bargaining. This background is the foundation for the 
workable, sustainable safeguards proposed. 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *6-31. 
17 Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *6-31. 
18 See N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (“Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco 
parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State . . . .”). 
19 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see also Collective 
Bargaining, supra note 3.  
A. Brief History on Collective Bargaining  
Collective bargaining is the process by which employees, represented collectively 
through their unions, negotiate the terms and conditions of their binding, written 
employment contract (the CBA) with their employer.20 These labor employment contract 
terms include the employees’ “pay, benefits, hours, leave, job health and safety policies, 
ways to balance work and family,” and other workplace-related conditions.21 
Unionization and collective bargaining in the employment arena trace their roots to 
the pre-Revolution era.22 As early as 1741, employees joined collectively to protest labor 
issues: New York City bakers quit their jobs and protested the regulation of the price of 
bread.23 Other craftsmen employees, including carpenters and shoemakers, also formed 
informal unions and crafted primitive, large-scale agreements with their employers in the 
years following the bakers’ protest.24 The employees frequently advocated for better 
working conditions, such as higher wages, the adoption of a minimum wage rate, and 
shorter work hours.25 These organization efforts came to a halt during the depression era 
in the late 1830s.26 Large-scale efforts returned during the mid-nineteenth century with 
national federations, such as the National Labor Union (1866),  the Noble Order of the 
Knights of Labor (1869), and the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions 
(1881), joining the organized labor arena.27 Despite the growth of organized unions, 
employers seldom recognized or tolerated these unions because employers perceived labor 
unions as an encroachment on the employers’ managerial powers.28 The employers often 
resisted the unionization of employees by employing nonunion employees and assisting in 
the prosecution of unions for conspiracy to restrain trade.29 
                                                 
20 See generally ANGELO DENISI & RICKY GRIFFIN, HR (3d ed. 2015) (detailing the collective bargaining 
process); see also Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4.  
21 See Collective Bargaining, supra note 3.   
22 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW, CH. 7, § 7.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2016). 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1 (1976), 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/bls/bls_1000_1976.pdf. 
26 See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 See BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 25, at 3.  
Statutorily formalized collective bargaining has a relatively shorter history.30 In 
1935, the United States Congress enacted the Wagner Act,31 which after several 
amendments, became known as the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).32 The NLRA 
declares the right and outlines the procedure for collective bargaining in the private 
sector.33 The NLRA served to restore equality of bargaining power between the employees 
and their employers.34  
Other major federal pieces of legislation changed and legitimized organized labor 
in the United States.35 The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 removed the courts’ power to 
enjoin certain union activities.36 The Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the 
Taft-Harley Act of 1947, prohibited closed shops that required union membership as a 
condition for employment, among other clauses.37 The Labor Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act of 1959, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, imposed internal union 
regulations and democratized labor unions internally by, for example, requiring internal 
voting on union decisions.38  
Legislatively recognized collective bargaining for state and federal public 
employees is a fairly novel concept.39 In 1959, Wisconsin passed the Municipal 
Employment Relations Act, granting public employees the right to bargain collectively.40 
In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10,988, granting federal 
government employees the right to assemble and bargain collectively.41 Since then, states 
                                                 
30 See generally Steven J. Scott, The Status Quo Doctrine: An Application to Salary Step Increases for 
Teachers, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 194 (1997). 
31 Wagner Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2016).  
32 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2016). 
33 Id.  
34 See Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4.  
35 See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01 (2).  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 See generally Lance Compa, An Overview of Collective Bargaining in the United States, CORNELL 
UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL 91 (2014), 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1925&context=articles. 
40 See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.  
41 Exec. Order No. 11,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1959-1963), revoked by Exec. Order 11,491, 3 C.F.R. § 861 
(1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994).  
across the nation have adopted similar laws that grant public employees the right to 
organize and bargain collectively for their contractual employment terms.42  
Educators are among the public employees who resort to collective bargaining 
through unions in the workplace.43 The National Education Association (NEA) and the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) are the two most prominent, active national 
teacher unions.44 As of 2007, teachers in 34 states and the District of Columbia, education 
support professionals in 32 states, and higher education faculty in 28 states had the right to 
bargain.45 On the other hand, six states explicitly prohibited bargaining in public 
education.46 Today, most states allow collective bargaining in the public sector, particularly 
for public school educators, and at least one state, Missouri, guarantees the right to bargain 
collectively in its constitution.47  
B. Arbitration Clauses in CBAs 
Arbitration clauses are not mandatory in employment contracts, but employers and 
unionized employees prefer to include these clauses in their CBAs.48 Employment relation 
disputes are generally arbitrable in the United States.49 Arbitration and the grievance 
procedure ensure that the contract terms are executed as initially agreed upon.50 Unions 
favor arbitration clauses because arbitration allows a neutral third party to determine 
whether the management has violated the CBA.51 The management would prefer a 
grievance procedure in which the aggrieved educator submits a grievance directly to the 
management, without third-party interference.52 The latter rarely occurs, even though 
                                                 
42 See Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4. 
43 Id. 
44 Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.  
45 See Collective Bargaining: What It Is And How It Works, supra note 4.  
46 Id.  
47 Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.  
48 See A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration, supra note 7, at 1 (“Even today it is the primary method 
utilized by public and private employers and unions to solve disputes that arise in the workplace under 
labor agreements.”).   
49 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
applies to all employment agreements, except for those involving transportation employees).  
50 Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01.  
51 See id. § 7.04.  
52 Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.04. 
arbitration is generally not statutorily mandated, because arbitration is beneficial in many 
respects.53 Arbitration offers dispute resolution expediency at a low cost and arbitrators 
with expertise on education matters.54  
The scope of arbitration agreements included in CBAs is subject to contract law 
interpretation and depends on the parties’ intent.55 A dispute in the workplace is not 
automatically subject to arbitration, unless “the grievance falls within the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement”56 and the CBA contains an arbitration clause. Pursuant 
to axioms of contract law, arbitration contracts are only valid when both parties have agreed 
to arbitrate.57 While some courts may have required clear pro-arbitration language in the 
contracts in order to uphold arbitration clauses,58 others have extended the federal favorable 
arbitration policy59 into public contracts.60 
 Certain matters are not arbitrable, or in some cases, not even subject to bargaining.61 
Educators and their employers are not bound to arbitrate matters specifically excluded from 
                                                 
53 Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.04. 
54 See id. 
55 Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01; see, e.g., Am. Arbitrations Ass’n v. N. Miami Cmty. Sch., 866 N.E.2d 296, 
301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“When determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, we apply 
ordinary contract principles governed by state law.”). 
56 Bd. of Educ. Of Chi. v. Ill. Educ. Labor Rels. Bd., Nos. 118043, 118072, 2015 Ill. LEXIS 1509, at *9 (Ill. 
Dec. 17, 2015). 
57 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960) (“The 
Congress, however, has by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, assigned the courts the duty of 
determining whether the reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. For arbitration is a matter of 
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to 
submit.”); see also AT&T Techs v. Communs. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (“This [contract 
law] axiom recognizes the fact that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the 
parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.”). 
58 See, e.g., Am. Arbitrations Ass’n, 866 N.E.2d at 301 (requiring parties to “clear[ly] have agreed to arbitrate” 
the issue); see also Acting Superintendent of Sch. of Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist. v. United Liverpool Faculty 
Ass’n, 369 N.E.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. 1977) (“[P]arties will not be held to have chosen arbitration as the forum 
for the resolution of their disputes in the absence of an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect; absent 
such an explicit commitment neither party may be compelled to arbitrate.”). 
59 See United Steelworkers of America, 363 U.S. at 582-83. 
60 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Watertown Educ. Ass’n, 710 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (N.Y. 1999).  
61 See generally Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State Public Employment 
Labor Relations, 84 A.L.R. 3d 242 (2016); Sch. Dist, 199 N.W.2d at 759 (explaining that managerial 
prerogatives and matters of public policy are not negotiable).  
arbitration in their CBA62 or excluded by state law.63 Education policy also falls outside 
the realm of arbitration.64 Public school education is a state creation,65 and thus the public’s 
interest and welfare weighs heavily when courts decide whether a matter is subject to 
arbitration.66   
III. ARBITRATING SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY MATTERS 
Disciplinary issues are arbitrable in certain jurisdictions.67 This section will focus 
on these jurisdictions. For purposes of this article, educator misconduct in school settings 
is characterized into two broad categories: (1) in-school misconduct unrelated to students, 
for example, failing to follow a supervisor’s directives; or (2) student-related misconduct, 
for example, pushing a student against the wall. Because this article focuses primarily on 
arbitrable disciplinary matters arising out of an educator’s student-related misconduct, this 
section will focus on judicial decisions regarding this type of misconduct. Moreover, this 
section will primarily, but not exclusively, include Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases 
to illustrate the issue. This is not because such cases are particular only to Pennsylvania 
and Massachusetts. Rather, the choice is due to Pennsylvania’s noteworthy educator 
reinstatements and Massachusetts’ legislative developments.68 Because the issue of 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Karetnikova v. Tr. Of Emerson Coll., 725 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Mass 1989) (explaining that, as per 
the contract, procedural issues were subject to arbitration and substantive issues could be brought in court); 
Sacred Heart Teachers’ Ass’n v. Sacred Heat High Sch. Corp., 782 A.2d 227, 230 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) 
(holding that nonrenewal of temporary employees was not arbitrable because the contract left the final 
determination to the superintendent).  
63 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 2015 Ill. LEXIS 1509, at *28 (explaining that a school district is not obligated 
to arbitrate matters not arbitrable under state law); see also Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Ill. Educ. 
Labor Relations Bd., 778 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that matters “that cannot be the 
subject of a collective bargaining agreement also cannot be arbitrated.”). 
64 See, e.g., Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, 363 N.E.2d 485, 490 (Mass. 1977) (“[In cases] 
in which the ingredient of educational policy is so comparatively heavy . . . even voluntary arbitration would 
be excluded.”); see also Reg’l Sch. Unit No. 5 v. Coastal Educ. Ass’n, 121 A.3d 98, 102-05 (Me. 2015) (The 
court rejected the arbitrators’ holding because the matter arbitrated, whether teachers were contractually 
required to be in their classrooms, was a matter of educational policy. The court held that teachers were 
required to be in their classrooms at certain times as a matter of educational policy because the teachers’ 
presence promotes student safety, among other reasons.).  
65 See infra note 171.  
66 See generally Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01; United Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. 
Dist.,  278 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Cal. 2012); Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 2015 Ill. LEXIS, at *1; Raines v. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 6, 796 P.2d 303, 303 (Okla. 1990); Central Falls Sch. Dist. Bd. of Tr. v. Central Falls Teachers 
Union, No. PC 2014-6275, 2015 R.I. Super. LEXIS 110, at *1 (Super. Ct. R.I. Aug. 28, 2015). 
67 See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.01; but see Roger Williams Univ. Faculty Ass’n v. Roger Williams Univ., 14 
F. Supp. 3d 27, 28 (D.R.I. 2014) (holding that a university faculty disciplinary matter was not arbitrable). 
68 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (LexisNexis 2016). 
children’s rights is a present concern regarding the current arbitrability of disciplinary 
matters, this section will only discuss arbitration cases available from 2000 onward.  
A. Contemporary Examples of Arbitral Awards and Judicial Review 
Judicial review of arbitral awards provides limited but valuable insight into the 
traditionally-private arbitration proceedings.69 Arbitral awards remain subject to judicial 
review, for example, to confirm or vacate an award.70 These awards may not be 
representative of all arbitral awards because most awards are private.71 But as illustrated 
below, these awards offer insight into trends in arbitral proceedings and judicial review of 
arbitral proceedings.  
As exemplified in this section, within the last fifteen years, arbitration awards in 
the public labor relations context have been largely favorable to employees facing adverse 
employment consequences. Some court opinions have focused on the protection of the 
public welfare.72 However, as illustrated below, most of the analysis addressed children’s 
rights vicariously, not directly. Two themes were prevalent. First, in cases where the 
educators’ misconduct was physical in nature, the arbitrators often reinstated the educators 
and the courts upheld the arbitrators’ awards. Second, in cases where the educators’ 
misconduct was sexual in nature, the arbitrators often reinstated the educators but, 
depending on the severity of the sexual misconduct and the amount of evidence weighing 
against the educators, the courts overturned the arbitrators’ awards.  
1. Physical Misconduct 
The survey of the cases yielded cases in which educators used physical force against 
students, and the arbitrators and courts often reinstated the educators. In the first case, 
School District of Kewaskum v. Kewaskum Education Association, the school district 
terminated a special education teacher’s employment after several students complained that 
she used excessive physical force against four students.73 The arbitrator, as the fact-finder, 
determined that the substantiated physical contact was permissible and incidental.74 
Relying heavily on the arbitrator’s findings, the court held that the arbitrator’s award did 
                                                 
69 See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 518 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Confidentiality is a natural 
outgrowth of the status of arbitrations as private alternatives to government-sponsored proceedings.”). 
70 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2016).  
71 See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 733 F.3d at 518. 
72 See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Teachers, No. 2015-04458, 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. 
Dec. LEXIS 185, *20-28 (Pa. C.P. May 4, 2016).  
73 Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum v. Kewaskum v. Educ. Ass’n, 840 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013). 
74 Id. at 722.  
not violate the law or public policy, was not immoral and did not lead to an environment 
that endangered the students’ mental or physical well-being because the contact was 
permissible and incidental.75   
In a second case, Rose Tree Media Secretaries & Educational Support Personnel 
Ass’n v. Rose Tree Media School District, the arbitrator reinstated a special education 
teacher who dragged a special needs student from outside the classroom to his desk because 
the student did not want to enter the classroom.76 The arbitrator found the situation to be a 
reprehensible one-time incident that did not violate public policy and was outweighed by 
the teacher’s track record.77 The court held that the arbitrator derived its decision from the 
essence of the CBA, and the arbitral award did not violate public policy.78  
In a third case, Mayberry v. DOD Dependents Schools Europe, the school 
terminated a first grade teacher after a parent complained that the teacher had harmed a 
student when the teacher lifted the student by the arms, pulling the student forcibly away 
from the student’s chair.79 Some students used the words “grabbed,” “yanked,” “shook,” 
and “hit” to describe what the teacher continuously did to other students.80 But, other 
students claimed to adore the teacher.81 The teacher admitted some of the allegations to the 
arbitrator, who upheld the teacher’s dismissal.82 The court, however, reinstated the teacher 
because the CBA’s contractual terms required progressive discipline of teachers.83 The 
three cases described in this section illustrate the potential difficulty for school districts to 
dismiss educators in cases involving the use of physical force.  
                                                 
75 Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 724. Although the opinion does not detail the behavior at issue, 
the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, a local online news medium, reported that the children alleged 
the teacher pinched students’ necks and shoulder areas, pulled the students’ arms, and pushed children into 
their chairs. See Arthur Thomas, Kewaskum School District Asks Court to Uphold Teacher’s Firing, 
MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN, JOURNAL SENTINEL (July 13, 2012), 
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/ozwash/kewaskum-school-district-asks-court-to-uphold-teachers-firing-
vr6486t-162424116.html?page=1.   
76 Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 136 A.3d 1069, 1072 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016). 
77 Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1074. 
78 Id. at 1080. 
79 Mayberry v. DOD Dependents Schs. Eur., 500 Fed. Appx. 935, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
80 Id. at 937. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 938-41.  
83 Id. at 940. 
2.  Sexual Misconduct 
The cases involving sexually-related misconduct varied by severity based on 
whether the educator in any given case had direct contact with the students, had multiple 
allegations of sexual misconduct, or showed remorse. The three features were not mutually 
exclusive. For example, in Cedar Education Association v. Cedarburg Board of 
Education,84 the Wisconsin Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s confirmation of an 
arbitral award reinstating a teacher who watched pornographic material during school 
hours on a school computer.85 Even though the educator did not come into sexual contact 
with the students, the educator’s behavior was likely contrary to what students and parents 
expected from a school teacher and role model.86 While the arbitrator found that a single 
incident in an otherwise unblemished eleven-year career did not merit dismissal,87 the 
Appellate Court reasoned that when a teacher engages in immoral behavior on school 
grounds, which violates public policy, the court must vacate the arbitral award pursuant to 
state law.88 The statute mandated that the court vacate an award when the arbitrator has 
exceeded his powers, and here the arbitrator exceeded his powers when he issued an award 
in violation of public policy.89  
Similarly, in 2001, in Fort Wayne Education Ass’n v. Fort Wayne Community 
Schools, the school terminated a long-serving substitute teacher who, while supervising a 
basketball practice, approached a female student, placed his hands inside his shorts, and 
told the student that he did not like the new underwear he was wearing.90 A few minutes 
later, he proceeded to tell her that he wanted to show her something “cool” but that she 
could not tell her parents, and then showed her his pierced nipple.91 He eventually 
                                                 
84 Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n v. Cedarburg Bd. of Educ., No. 2007AP852, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *1 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2008). 
85 Id. at *11. 
86 See, e.g., Parent, Student, and Teacher Expectations, TUSCANO ELEMENTARY SCH.,  
http://tusc.fesd.org/staff_websites/special_education/mrs__czoka/parent__student__and_teacher_expectatio
ns/ (last visited May 7, 2017) (“Teachers are expected to help students by: . . . showing that they care about 
all students, having high expectations for themselves and students, [and] providing a safe and supportive 
learning environment.”); Teachers as Role Models, TEACH, https://teach.com/what/teachers-change-
lives/teachers-are-role-models/ (last visited May 7, 2017) (“A role model can be anybody: a parent, a sibling, 
a friend but some of our most influential and life-changing role models are teachers.”).  
87 Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560,  at *12.  
88 Id. at *14; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.10 (West 2016).  
89 Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *14.  
90 Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 753 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
91 Id.  
apologized for making her feel uncomfortable.92 The arbitrator reinstated him, concluding 
that the penalty was too severe for the misconduct.93 The Appellate Court determined that 
the arbitrator did not modify the CBA, exceeding his powers94 in violation of state law,95 
and did not manifestly disregard the law by concluding that the substitute teacher did not 
act immorally.96 Rather, the arbitrator simply interpreted the school code as best the 
arbitrator could.97 Here, the misconduct, while inappropriate, did not constitute sexual 
harassment as defined in the school code.98 Therefore, the substitute’s reinstatement on the 
middle school’s list of available substitute teachers and partial back pay was merited.99 The 
court in City School District of the City of New York v. McGraham also reinstated the 
educator, upholding an arbitral award, which suspended but did not terminate a high school 
teacher who had attempted to pursue an intimate relationship with one of her students,100 
because she expressed remorse and willingness to change.101 The dissenting judge 
expressed his concern about returning the teacher to school because this would pose a risk 
to future students.102 The court in Neshaminy School District v. Neshaminy Federation of 
Teachers, reached an opposite outcome and held that the arbitral award reinstating a 
teacher who used sexually-charged language toward his teaching assistant in front of his 
                                                 
92 Id.  
93 Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d at 675. 
94 Id. at 677 (The trial court held the arbitrator modified the CBA by precluding the teacher’s termination 
under any circumstance. The Appellate court reversed.).  
95 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-57-2-13(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (providing narrow grounds for vacating an award 
when the arbitrator exceeds his or her powers). 
96 Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d. at 679 (“[The substitute teacher’s] conduct, as explained above, was 
an isolated incident--not a course of conduct. Moreover, it does not rise to the level of conviction for any 
offense, let alone the serious sex offenses listed in Indiana Code section 20-6.1-4-10(a)(6) and cited by [the 
school]. The arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law in concluding that [the substitute teacher’s] 
conduct was not immoral.”). 
97 Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d at 677. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 680 (The Appellate Court ordered the substitute teacher’s reinstatement only on the list because the 
Court found that the arbitrator had exceeded his power in ordering reinstatement of the substitute teacher for 
the following academic year. The Court stated, “[The substitute teacher], as a long-term substitute, had no 
‘rights’ or ‘security’ for the succeeding academic year, except that he not be replaced by another substitute 
teacher without cause.”). 
100 City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. v. McGraham, 905 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90-91 (App. Div. 2010). 
101 Id. at 93. 
102 Id. at 93-97 (Acosta, J., dissenting). 
students violated public policy103 because sexual harassment in the workplace is not 
permissible104 and the reinstatement would result in continued exposure to the sexually-
suggestive bantering.105   
The remainder of the cases involved educators who came in direct contact with the 
students. Some courts and arbitrators have been more willing to vacate or modify an arbitral 
award or school district decision when the teacher misconduct is sexually-related and 
sufficient evidence supports the claims.106 In Bethel Park School District v. Bethel Park 
Federation of Teachers, the district terminated a seventh-grade mathematics teacher’s 
employment after learning the teacher had engaged in inappropriate contact with several 
female students, holding their hands and rubbing their backs or legs when he would help 
them with their math homework.107 The Court held that the arbitrator did not rationally 
derive the decision from the CBA when reinstating the teacher but rather reached his own 
conclusion unsupported by the CBA.108 Moreover, the arbitral award violated “well-
defined and established public policy of protecting students from sexual harassment during 
school hours, on school property” as defined in the District’s policy against unlawful 
harassment.109 This case merited the use of the narrow public policy exception.110 
Similarly, in East Bridgwater [sic] Public Schools, the school dismissed a teacher who 
asked a young girl to sit on his lap and then proceeded to place his hand directly on her 
private areas.111 Even though the conduct was serious, the arbitrator warned that he would 
have to reinstate the teacher if he found the reinstatement would be in the best interests of 
the students, as required by the Massachusetts teacher dismissal statute.112 However, 
because the District proved with substantial evidence that the teacher continued asking 
                                                 
103 Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *20. 
104 Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *21-24. 
105 Id. at *26. 
106 See, e.g., Bethel Park Sch. Dist. v. Bethel Park Fed’n. of Teachers, 55 A.3d 154, 161-62 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2012). Some arbitrators have gone further and not required direct evidence of current misconduct against 
students. For example, in Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 196 F. Supp. 2d 229, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), the arbitrator 
terminated the high school teacher’s employment after determining that the teacher’s membership in the 
North American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), which promotes sexual activity between adult 
males and boys in possible violation of New York Statutes, would reasonably interfere with his ability to 
provide a “valid educational experience” for the students. 
107 Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 158. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 160-61.  
110 Id. at 161. 
111 East Bridgwater [sic] Public Schools, 11-390-02251-01 (2002) (Dunn, Arb). 
112 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (LexisNexis 2016). 
young children to sit on his lap after being warned to stop, the teacher’s misconduct 
outweighed the teacher’s “impressive” classroom results.113 In Bonang v. New Haven 
Board of Education, a Connecticut arbitrator also terminated a teacher’s employment after 
determining that the teacher had a long history of inappropriate sexual behavior and 
reprimands against such behavior.114 The Court affirmed the award.115  
  The courts in two court cases described the reinstatement of the educators, even 
though the educators came in direct contact with the students. First, in D.C.G. & P.J.G. v. 
Wilson Area School District, the arbitrator reinstated the teacher with back pay and 
benefits.116 The court’s analysis did not provide great detail on the arbitration proceedings 
because the claim before the court was a constitutional claim. However, the opinion 
describes allegations that he had touched a student’s shoulders and neck, played with her 
hair, continually complimented her on her physical appearance, asked her whether she had 
“slept around with guys,” and cupped her breasts, to name a few incidents.117 Several other 
females came forward to make similar accusations after the first student.118 Second, in 
Franklin Regional School District v. Franklin Regional Education Association, the District 
terminated an elementary teacher after several female students accused him of touching 
them while they attended his music lessons.119 The arbitrator reinstated the teacher because 
he found the teacher more credible than the young students and because the Police 
department and Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services did not proceed with 
the case.120 The cases in this section illustrate a variety of outcomes. The results vary, in 
part, because the claims and the claims’ elements before the arbitrators and courts are 
different. 
B. Discussion of Contemporary Trends in Public Relations Arbitration 
Proceedings 
 None of the cases  discussed above describe the arbitrator’s direct analysis of the 
children’s rights or the potential risk of harm to other students upon reinstatement of the 
                                                 
113 East Bridgwater [sic] Public Schools, 11-390-02251-01 (2002) (Dunn, Arb). 
114 Bonang v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., No. CV094039902S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 862, at *4, *30 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2011). 
115 Id. at *30. 
116 D.C.G. & P.J.G. v. Wilson Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-cv-1357, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26446, at *7 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 25, 2009). 
117 Id. at *5. 
118 Id. at *6. 
119 Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Franklin Reg’l Educ. Ass’n, No. 114 C.D. 2015, No. 147 C.D. 2015, 2016 
Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 33, at *3-5. (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 7, 2016). 
120 Id. at *5. 
teachers.121 Instead, the cases presented above illustrate the arbitrators’ willingness to 
reinstate teachers subject to disciplinary proceedings if the teachers have no prior 
disciplinary records.122 The analyses sometimes focus on whether the districts followed the 
proper disciplinary procedures outlined in the CBA123 and, if so, whether reinstatement 
would violate a well-defined public policy.124  
The cases presented above represent the cases in which reinstatement is difficult.125 
While the educator may have behaved inappropriately, in some cases, the educator has an 
exemplary track record.126 The cases also demonstrate that CBAs often require progressive 
discipline (e.g., providing warnings, an opportunity to improve, and short suspensions) and 
other notification requirements (e.g., providing a written letter notifying the teacher of the 
charges) prior to full employment termination.127 Notwithstanding the CBA clauses, the 
schools often terminate the employees after the first instance of egregious misconduct.128 
However difficult these cases may be, arbitrators and the courts should consider children’s 
rights in their analyses.  
Children’s rights are not at the forefront of arbitration proceedings or the courts’ 
analyses of educators’ dismissal disputes, but are rather an afterthought, if present at all. 
Largely, neither the arbitrator nor the courts directly consider the risk to students when 
reinstating a teacher who has engaged in serious student-related misconduct.129 First, the 
arbitrators’ analyses focus on the CBA and whether the educator violated the school code 
                                                 
121 See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing the arbitrators’ and courts’ analyses, none of which 
included direct extensive discussions on children’s rights or the potential risk to other students upon 
reinstatement).  
122 E.g., Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1074. 
123 E.g., Mayberry, 500 Fed. Appx. at 940.  
124 See Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *20; Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 
Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *14; Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 724; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & 
Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1080; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 160-61. 
125 See generally discussion supra Section III.A. 
126 E.g., Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1074; Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 
2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560,  at *12. 
127 E.g., Mayberry, 500 Fed. Appx. at 940. 
128 Sch. Dist. of Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 721; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 
A.3d at 1072; Mayberry, 500 Fed. Appx. at 938; City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 905 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90; 
Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *2; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 158; 
East Bridgwater [sic] Public Schools, 11-390-02251-01 (2002) (Dunn, Arb); Bonang, 2011 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 862, at *4, *30; Wilson Area Sch. Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26446, at *7; Franklin Reg’l Sch. 
Dist., 2016 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 33, at *3-5.  
129 See discussion supra Section III.A (describing the issues the arbitrators and courts considered in these 
cases and illustrating that arbitrators and judges generally do not fully consider the risk posed to other students 
upon the educators’ reinstatement). 
or any other statutory mandates130 or whether the district has sufficient grounds, or just 
cause, to terminate the employee.131 Generally, the just cause requirement demands more 
than a single incident, even if the incident is egregious.132 Second, the cases above 
demonstrate that the courts, in reviewing arbitral awards, have largely remained deferential 
to arbitration awards, vacating awards only on limited occasions, such as when the award 
contravenes a narrowly-defined public policy.133  
Public policy and other related exceptions134 offer the only opportunities for 
arbitrators and courts to consider the children’s rights, but these exceptions are not enough. 
For example, in Pennsylvania, a court reviewing an arbitral award in a teacher dismissal 
case due to in-school, student-related misconduct is primarily concerned with whether the 
arbitral award rationally flows from the CBA.135 In other words, the court first determines 
whether the arbitrator interpreted the contract properly and whether the arbitrator exceeded 
his or her power as granted by the CBA. It is only after this analysis that the court 
determines whether the arbitral award violates public policy.136 In addition, the public 
policy must be well-defined, not simply represent normative value judgments of what 
should be considered public policy.137 The cases show that this is a difficult burden to 
meet.138 Moreover, even when the parties meet the burden, the public policy analysis tends 
to focus on how the reinstatement of the teacher would affect the workplace environment, 
not how the reinstatement would affect the children under the educator’s care.139 If the 
                                                 
130 See, e.g., Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d. at 677-79. 
131 E.g., Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1073-75.  
132 Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1080-81. 
133 See, e.g., Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *14; Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. 
Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *20. 
134 See, e.g., Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n, 753 N.E.2d. at 679 (discussing “manifest disregard of the law” as an 
exception to upholding arbitral awards).  
135 See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *10-21. 
136 See, e.g., id. at *21-31; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1071.  
137 See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *10; Sch. Dist. of 
Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 722; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1071; 
Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *7-8; Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. 
Dec. LEXIS 185, at *17-18, 20-21; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 160-61. 
138 See, e.g., Colonial Intermediate Unit #20, 2015 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 103, at *10; Sch. Dist. of 
Kewaskum, 840 N.W.2d at 722; Rose Tree Media Sec’ys & Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 136 A.3d at 1071; 
Cedarburg Educ. Ass’n, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 560, at *7-8; Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. 
Dec. LEXIS 185, at *17-18, 20-21; Bethel Park Sch. Dist., 55 A.3d at 160-61; see also discussion infra 
Section III.C. 
139 See, e.g., Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 2016 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 185, at *27-28 (“Appellant further 
complains that this Court erred in finding that the arbitration decision was a violation of a dominant public 
policy against immoral conduct. However, we did not make any such finding in granting Appellee’s Petition 
district succeeds in showing that the arbitral award violates public policy, the children will 
benefit. For example, a teacher who lacks self-control would no longer be in the classroom 
with the students.  
The cases described above present an issue of focus. As discussed in this section, 
children’s rights rarely play an important role in the analysis, and when the arbitrators or 
courts discuss the children’s rights during arbitration or court proceedings, they often 
discuss the rights only minimally, as an afterthought, or only vicariously. The particular 
vulnerabilities of primary and secondary students and the importance of providing a safe 
education environment140 demands that children’s rights play a major role in the arbitration 
or judicial analysis.  
The following section highlights how the judicial branch can play a strong role in 
reviewing arbitral awards after an arbitrator has rendered a decision. When a court directly 
considers the best interests of the students, the students benefit directly. However, not all 
arbitral awards will undergo judicial review because of arbitration’s private  nature.141  
C. Recent Developments in the Public School Labor Relations Context 
Recent developments in different states are beginning to shape the interpretation of 
public employer-employee contractual relations in arbitration cases. Some states have 
taken a strong stance, prohibiting collective bargaining of public employee disciplinary 
matters or granting public employers the right to not bargain disciplinary matters if the 
employers so desire.142 In contrast, Massachusetts has adopted a teacher dismissal 
                                                 
and thereby vacating the arbitration award. The arbitration award was vacated solely due to its unacceptable 
risk of violating a dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the classroom . . . .”). 
140 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979) (“[Children have the] inability to make critical decisions 
in an informed mature manner . . . .”); Eddings v. Okla., 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982), superseded by statute, 21 
Okl. S. § 701.13 (explaining that minors “lack experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults”); 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“[Children] have limited ‘contro[l] over their own 
environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.”). 
141 See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 733 F.3d at 518 (“Confidentiality is a natural outgrowth of the status of 
arbitrations as private alternatives to government-sponsored proceedings.”).  
142 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 111.70 (4) (mb) (2017) (The statute states, in pertinent part, “The municipal 
employer is prohibited from bargaining collectively with a collective bargaining unit containing a general 
municipal employee with respect to the following: 1. Any factor or condition of employment except wages . 
. . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08 (C)(5) (LexisNexis 2017) (“Unless a public employer agrees 
otherwise in a collective bargaining agreement, nothing in Chapter 4117 of the Revised Code impairs the 
right and responsibility of each public employer to: . . . (5) Suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just 
cause, or lay off, transfer, assign, schedule, promote, or retain employees . . . .”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
3543.2(b) (Deering 2017) (“[T]he public school employer and the exclusive representative shall, upon 
request of either party, meet and negotiate regarding causes and procedures for disciplinary action, other than 
dismissal, including suspension of pay for up to 15 days, affecting certificated employees.”) (emphasis 
added); D.C. CODE § 1-617.08 (a)(2)-(3), (a-1) (2017) (“The respective personnel authorities (management) 
shall retain the sole right, in accordance with applicable law and rules and regulations: . . . (2) to hire, promote, 
transfer, assign, retain employees in positions within the agency and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take 
other disciplinary action against employees for cause; (3) To relieve employees of duties because of lack of 
work or other legitimate reasons . . . (a-1) An act, exercise, or agreement of the respective personnel 
statute.143 The statute allows district superintendents to dismiss teachers and provides the 
procedures that the district must follow when dismissing the district employee.144 The 
practical effects of the statute have proven effective vis-à-vis children’s rights because the 
statute requires that the arbitrator “consider the best interests of the pupils.”145 Moreover, 
judicial review of the teacher dismissal statute is less deferential than the review of arbitral 
awards arising out of the CBAs because the Court has the jurisdiction to interpret statutes 
de novo.146 Within the last fifteen years, after the enactment of the statute, the 
Massachusetts courts’ judicial review of arbitral awards has shifted toward an emphasis on 
the children’s best interests, as illustrated in the following two cases.147  
In School District v. Geller, the principal suspended the teacher for “conduct 
unbecoming a teacher” after determining that, on three separate occasions, the teacher 
pushed three students against the wall while screaming at the students.148 The arbitrator 
described the behavior as inappropriate, but after considering the teacher’s twenty years of 
experience, lack of prior disciplinary record, and previous positive evaluations, concluded 
that the teacher should be reinstated because reinstatement was in the “best interests” of 
the students.149  
 The judges in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts did not write a majority 
opinion.150 Instead, the judges on the Court wrote two concurrences offering the following 
two distinct focuses: (1) the teacher dismissal statute, and (2) the violation of public 
                                                 
authorities (management) shall not be interpreted in any manner as a waiver of the sole management rights . 
. .”). 
143 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (LexisNexis 2016). 
144 § 42. 
145 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Geller, 755 N.E.2d 1241, 1250 (Mass. 2001).  
146 Id. at 1246 (“Where the determinations to be made are primarily issues of public law, the arbitrator 
possesses no special expertise. Hence, the responsibility for interpreting the meaning of [the statute], and the 
scope of the arbitrator’s authority thereunder remains with the court. It cannot be ceded to the arbitrator by 
agreement of the parties, and has not been ceded to the arbitrator in the statute.”) (internal citations omitted).  
147 Geller, 755 N.E.2d 1241; Sch. Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski, 12 N.E.3d 384 (Mass. 2014). Cf. City of 
Worcester v. Worcester Vocational Teachers Ass’n, No. 98-1686B, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 75, at *5 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1999) (noting the deferential standard when reviewing arbitral awards, the Court dismissed 
the city and school’s complaint and reemphasized that “[a]bsent fraud, the court’s inquiry is confined to the 
question [of] whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his reference or awarded relief in excess of his 
authority.” (quoting Sch. Comm. of Waltham v. Waltham Educators Ass’n, 500 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Mass. 
1986))). 
148 Geller, 755 N.E.2d at 1243 (Cordy, J., concurring).  
149 Id. at 1244. 
150 See generally id.  
policy.151 Judge Cordy, in the first concurrence, argued that the arbitral award violated the 
dismissal statute.152 Judge Cordy recognized that the arbitrator derived his authority from 
the CBA, but emphasized that the authority to arbitrate a teacher dismissal case now derives 
from the statute.153 Judge Cordy explained that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when 
the arbitrator weighed the teacher’s experience against the severity of the punishment 
because the statute provides a list of grounds for dismissal that do not permit additional 
analysis.154 Judge Cordy further noted: “to improve the education provided to the students 
in the classrooms of our public schools . . . [The] statute is not only about the relationship 
between the employer and employee, it is about the education of students.”155 
 In the second concurrence, Judge Ireland asserted that the award should be vacated 
because the award violated public policy.156 Massachusetts has a strong public policy 
against teachers using physical force against students. Judge Ireland explained that the 
reinstatement was not merited because the teacher “pushed, shoved, jabbed, dragged, 
knocked down, . . . slammed into a locker,” and bruised three sixth-graders. Judge Ireland 
remained cognizant of the strong policy requiring the Court to remain “heav[ily]” 
deferential to arbitration awards, avoiding the “judicializ[ation]” of the arbitration process. 
But, Judge Ireland explained that Massachusetts has a strong policy to protect the children 
of Massachusetts, and the teacher’s conduct was antithetical to his duties as a teacher; 
accordingly, the misconduct violated the public policy.157   
 Judge Ireland emphasized several key points. The teacher’s misconduct went 
directly to the crux of the teacher’s duties because the teacher is tasked with creating a safe 
environment conducive to student growth.158 The reinstatement of a teacher who used 
physical force against his students would be absolutely inappropriate.159 Judge Ireland 
condemned the teacher reinstatement stating, “Where the court must balance two 
competing policies, i.e., one favoring arbitration and one protecting our children, I do not 
hesitate to conclude that the latter outweighs the former.”160  
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 In 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the scope of the 
arbitrator’s authority under the teacher dismissal statute in School Committee of Lexington 
v. Zagaeski.161 In Zagaeski, the Court vacated the arbitral award that reinstated a teacher 
who jokingly told his female student that she could not pay for better grades with anything 
else other than sexual favors.162 The Court emphasized that teachers hold an important 
position of public trust and children rely on adults to use sound judgment, draw appropriate 
boundaries when necessary,163 and have a right to be free from sexual harassment.164 
Returning the teacher to the classroom would be at odds with the purpose of the statute to 
create an educational setting in which students’ self-esteem is protected.165 Moreover, a 
teacher has the duty to prepare children to become responsible citizens in a democracy, and 
a student who witnesses sexual harassment in the classroom may learn that such conduct 
is not only acceptable, but should be modeled.166 Here, the arbitrator erred because the 
statute required that when determining whether to dismiss a teacher who creates an unsafe 
environment for the students, the arbitrator must consider the “best interests of the pupils,” 
not the teacher’s track record.167 The District rightfully dismissed him.168  
 These Massachusetts cases illustrate how judicial review can allow courts to 
consider the best interests of the students after the arbitrator has rendered an award. This 
trend in Massachusetts deviates from the traditional deferential review of arbitral awards 
as illustrated in Section III.A,169 but is justified because the primary and secondary 
education field is of a sui generis nature.170 
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IV. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
A. Primary and Secondary Education as a Sui Generis Sphere 
Given that the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention education, the 
states are primarily responsible for regulating matters related to education.171 Today, all 
states not only provide primary and secondary public school education for all school-age 
children, but have compulsory attendance laws.172 In 2008, children in public schools spent 
an average of 6.64 hours per day at school, or 1,195 hours.173 Some have categorized 
education as the most important government duty.174   
1. Children Have Special Characteristics Rendering Them Vulnerable 
The law has traditionally regarded children as a population that requires special 
considerations.175 In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court succinctly stated: 
 
Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal 
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning 
if uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s duty towards 
children. The unique role in our society of the family, the institution by 
which “we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, 
moral and cultural,” requires that constitutional principles be applied with 
sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We 
have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the 
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the 
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions 
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in 
child rearing.176  
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In 1982, the United States Supreme Court reemphasized the vulnerability of 
children when deciding Eddings v. Oklahoma, explaining that “during the formative years 
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment 
expected of adults.”177 In 2012, the Supreme Court again noted the vulnerability of 
children.178 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court first recognized that children “lack . . .  
maturity” and have an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”179  The Court then noted 
that “children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ 
including from their family and peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own 
environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing 
settings.”180 Finally the Court noted that “a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an 
adult’s.”181  
These cases are illustrative of the law’s view of children. Children are a special 
population with particular vulnerabilities attributed to the children’s underdevelopment. 
Their vulnerabilities and underdevelopment make them dependent on their caregivers, for 
protection from harm and child rearing.182 As discussed below, the schools that children 
attend owe children certain responsibilities.  
2. School In Loco Parentis 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that schools act in loco parentis 
when children attend school.183 This does not mean that the school has a constitutional 
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“duty to protect” the children.184 Rather, the children’s rights in the school context are 
restricted by the school’s interest in control over the students and safety for all.185 Schools 
do not simply substitute the parents’ role along with all duties and responsibilities.   
Primary and secondary educators play a special role during the school hours when 
they have direct contact with children.186 In Cobb v. W. Va Human Rights, West Virginia’s 
Supreme Court of Appeals explained the principle: “‘[T]eachers are not merely instructors 
in sciences and letters. They are authority figures, role models, behavioral examples, 
surrogate parents.’ . . . [W]e hold, West Virginia public school teachers and school 
administrators stand in loco parentis to their students.”187 
The vulnerability and mental underdevelopment of these children warrants the 
categorization of primary and secondary education as a sui generis sphere. Primary and 
secondary public school students become vulnerable third parties of public employer-
employee arbitration disputes if the educator returns to the classroom with the students. 
The students’ vulnerable position implies that safeguards such as the ones detailed in the 
next section must be in place to protect students.  
B. Children as Third Party Recipients of School-Educator Arbitration Agreements 
Vis-à-vis Discipline Matters 
Upon review of the children’s vulnerabilities188 and the school’s in loco parentis 
role during school hours,189 one can conclude that negative situations occurring in school 
settings can have a detrimental effect on students. For example, a teacher who continuously 
humiliates students, like the teacher in Colonial Intermediate Unit,190 presents a special 
threat to the students’ the wellbeing. Although CBAs are contractual in nature, jurisdictions 
can implement safeguards that respect freedom of contract in a manner that is considerate 
of children’s rights.  
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V.  WORKABLE & SUSTAINABLE SAFEGUARDS FOR SCHOOL-EDUCATOR ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS 
This section will propose three major potential safeguards that can be implemented 
in the school-educator arbitration procedures to mitigate or avoid potential unintended, 
negative consequences on students after an educator is reinstated. Proposed safeguards 
must be both workable and sustainable to ensure success. After introducing each potential 
safeguard, this section will analyze the workability and sustainability of each alternative. 
Each potential safeguard has its strengths and weaknesses.  
Recognizing that education is within the states’ spheres,191 and that education 
operates within a loose-coupling system,192 this section presents the strengths and 
weakness of all three potential solutions and urges jurisdictions to adopt one or a 
combination of the three safeguards that are feasible and best account for the jurisdiction’s 
particular needs. While the analysis presented below is comprehensive, different 
jurisdictions may find that the analysis is not exhaustive. Jurisdictions should weigh 
additional considerations not listed herein. Ultimately, the safeguard(s) adopted should be 
the closest to an ideal solution for the jurisdiction and should recognize and consider the 
children’s rights. Ideally, jurisdictions will adopt the most feasible safeguard and will 
incrementally allocate more responsibility to other key players, namely, the judiciary and 
legislative branch, the arbitrators, and the public employer and employee.  
A. Legislative and Judicial Safeguards: Independent and Concerted Efforts 
1. Proposed Safeguards 
 Legislatures may adopt any of the following proposals. First, the state legislatures 
that have not done so can enact laws that make public employees disciplinary matters non-
bargainable.193 Some states’ legislatures have enacted laws that make certain matters non-
bargainable and, consequently, non-arbitrable.194 Once employee disciplinary matters 
become non-bargainable, a public employer has the discretion to decide how to handle 
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employee misconduct.195 One approach an employer can take is to forgo progressive 
disciplinary proceedings and adopt zero tolerance policies when the employer perceives 
that the employee acted in a manner contrary to what society expects of educators.196  
Second, the state legislatures can enact laws that make disciplinary matters non-
arbitrable, leaving disciplinary matters outside the scope of the arbitration clause in the 
CBA.197 This proposal differs from the first because this proposal bars arbitration but 
permits the possibility to still bargain employee discipline procedures. For example, both 
parties may bargain for and agree that a teacher who engages in sexual misconduct with a 
student will be immediately terminated. Because the public employee and employer are 
still able to bargain certain measures, the second proposal also allows the parties to retain 
their party autonomy.198 One major caveat for this proposal is that a court may overrule a 
law that restricts arbitrability pursuant to the federal policy favoring arbitration.199 
Third, the state legislatures can enact laws that allow public employers and 
employees to bargain and arbitrate employee disciplinary matters but requires that the 
arbitrator, and subsequently the courts, consider the best interests of the students when 
considering whether to reinstate an educator who has engaged in student-related 
misconduct.200 The legislature would have to determine what boundaries are most 
appropriate in its jurisdiction. For example, the legislature may decide to include an 
enumerated list of misconduct that warrants immediate discharge. The legislatures can also 
model their statutes after Massachusetts’s. Massachusetts’s teacher dismissal statute 
presents an example that has served to bring the student’s rights to the forefront in these 
type of arbitration cases.201 The statute details the procedure that public employers must 
follow when discharging the employee.202 The statute also mandates that the arbitrator 
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determine whether it is in the “best interests of the pupils” to reinstate a teacher when a 
teacher dismissal dispute is at issue in an arbitration proceeding.203 
The states’ judiciary branch can follow other jurisdictions and shift its focus to 
children’s rights during judicial review of arbitral awards involving educators’ student-
related misconduct. First, the courts can work independent from, but implicitly in 
conjunction with, the legislature by interpreting teacher dismissal statutes using a 
children’s rights focus, as required in such statutes. In these cases, the arbitrators exercise 
the power to interpret the statute but the courts retain jurisdiction to review the statute’s 
meaning de novo204 because courts are equipped with the power to interpret and determine 
what the law is.205 Geller and Zagaeski, the two Massachusetts cases, illustrate this second 
potential safeguard.206 
Second, courts may choose to take a less deferential standard when reviewing 
arbitration awards that concern the reinstatement of educators who engaged in student-
related misconduct.207 Geller illustrates how this safeguard would potentially operate in 
practice. In Geller, Judge Ireland explained that in order to consider the best interests of 
the students, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had to be less deferential to arbitration 
awards and allocate greater weight to the public policy calling for the protection of children 
in schools.208 This safeguard is effective because the court directly considers the risks, 
harms, and other consequences that students face after the reinstatement of an educator 
who previously engaged in student-related misconduct.  
Finally, the courts can hold that public school employee’s disciplinary matters are 
managerial or educational public policy matters and thus non-negotiable and non-
arbitrable.209 Categorizing disciplinary matters as managerial and as pertaining to 
educational public policy prevents the union from bargaining or arbitrating the matter and 
allows the employer to retain discretion over employee disciplinary matters.210  
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2. Workability and Sustainability of Legislative and Judicial Safeguards 
Legislative action is workable and sustainable. Legislative action would be lengthy 
during the drafting phase but expedient during execution.211 The process of policy making 
varies from state to state because each state is autonomous. In order to draft and pass 
legislation that will have the effect of the law, the majority of legislators often need to agree 
on the terms.212 The process can be complicated and lengthy because the legislation may 
pass through different committees before reaching the Governor’s desk.213 However, once 
the legislation is enacted, the statute has a chance of expedient implementation.  
 Simple mandates are capable of immediate implementation because they do not 
require many resources for full compliance.214 Speed limits are an example of simple 
mandates. Under these mandates, a driver violates the mandate if the driver drives over the 
speed limit.215 Consequences may follow, namely a monetary fine.216 Conversely, to follow 
the mandate, the driver need only drive at or below the speed limit. The action does not 
require additional resources in order to comply. This example shows that a bright-line rule, 
when feasible, can be effective in certain situations. Similarly, state legislatures can enact 
laws that clearly prohibit educator disciplinary matters from collective bargaining or 
potentially arbitration, or that do not prohibit bargaining or arbitration, but do set 
limitations.217 Compliance with these laws would not require any resources besides the 
unions’ and the public employers’ recognition that they cannot submit disciplinary issues 
to arbitration.  
A statute is also highly sustainable over time because once a jurisdiction decides to 
enact legislation, the legislation will remain in place until the legislature decides to undergo 
the lengthy law-making process to supersede the law with new legislation218 or until a court 
declares the legislation defective or inoperative in some way.219  
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The judicial safeguards proposed are also workable and sustainable. For example, 
in Massachusetts, the court’s heightened focus on the students’ best interests have proven 
effective for over a decade after the legislature enacted the teacher dismissal statute.220   
B. Public Employer-Employee Reform Oriented Safeguard: Advocating for Non-
Arbitrability of Educator Disciplinary Matters 
This section presents two safeguards that are particularly promising. As two 
autonomous parties who have the freedom of contract to decide what employment contract 
provisions to bargain for and include within the arbitration clauses’ scope,221 the public 
employer and employee may choose one of the following proposals without legislative or 
judicial action: (1) refrain from bargaining employee disciplinary matters or (2) bargain 
disciplinary procedures but refrain from including employee disciplinary matters within 
the scope of the arbitration clause. The two options require commitment from both parties 
and willingness to curtail some of the current benefits enjoyed222 in order to further the 
students’ best interests. Reforms from within, involving the two primary parties, are more 
likely to last because union members are more likely to exhibit buy-in when the union 
members are part of the policy-making process.223  
1. Workability and Sustainability of Internal Safeguards 
The proposed safeguards can be difficult to implement. Unions and employers 
favor arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution because the method provides 
expediency, relatively low costs, and expertise.224 A reform from within would require that 
one party (or both parties) change his or her view on what furthers his or her self-interests 
and focus on what best serves the best interests of the students. Such reform may be 
difficult because the approach is contrary to the current approach, where the employer 
advocates for the employer’s self-interests and the union advocates for the union members’ 
interests.225  
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To understand the difficulty of implementing an internal reform, consider the 
alternatives for both parties. Based on the historical background and current arbitration 
trends in public employer-employee relations, if the employer advocates for and succeeds 
in not bargaining or arbitrating employee disciplinary matters, the employer will only have 
two alternatives: (1) an internal grievance mechanism or (2) the court system.226 An 
internal grievance system is desirable from the employer’s perspective but this grievance 
process is unlikely to prevail as the chosen mechanism because the union is unlikely to 
agree to that term.227 Both parties will likely prefer the first option because the second 
option, the court system, can be lengthy and costly.228 Costs and lengthy procedures may 
deter the employer from litigating employee dismissal disputes if the employer considers 
the claims too weak to warrant further pursuance.  
Union members would also face the same two primary alternatives: (1) use the 
internal grievance procedures or (2) file a complaint with the court system. Arbitration 
serves as the number one method to ensure fidelity to the arbitration clauses.229 Thus, 
neither of the two alternatives may be ideal for educators.230 An internal grievance process 
can be implicitly or explicitly biased because the board will likely be composed of the 
public employer’s management.231 Because a teacher dismissal grievance places the 
teacher in an adversarial position against the employer, an internal grievance procedure can 
be intimidating for the educator.232 Bargaining for an internal grievance procedure also 
virtually eliminates the employees’ equal bargaining power because in an internal 
grievance proceeding the employer has direct control over the creation of the clauses 
governing the internal grievance proceeding.233 The union would also have the court 
system as an alternative.234 This option may be costly and lengthy, particularly for the 
union members who may be less financially stable than the employer and may be less likely 
than the employer to have the necessary funds to litigate the matter over protracted periods 
of time. The risk of lengthy and costly proceedings may persuade the union to agree to an 
internal grievance proceeding, leaving the union members at a disadvantage. 
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Though difficult to implement, once implemented, the safeguards (refraining from 
bargaining disciplinary matters or bargaining disciplinary matters but refraining from 
arbitrating such matters) offer benefits to both parties and ensure long-term sustainability. 
The management will not see its managerial powers infringed because the management 
will be able to decide on the appropriate methods of discipline, without third party 
interference.235 On the other hand, union members can benefit from litigating first, rather 
than arbitrating first. A judicial forum affords the right to jury trial.236 This can be 
significant for the employees because the jury may be composed of other employees who 
are more likely to understand the employee’s position.237 The union would also benefit, as 
the union would avoid spending time and money arbitrating, and subsequently spending 
additional time and money going to court for judicial review. In other words, having only 
the judicial system as an option allows the union to litigate the matter in this forum without 
having to first submit the dispute to arbitration. A single proceeding saves time and 
money.238 Moreover, a judicial forum allows the employees to perform extensive discovery 
and present all relevant material to present a full case.239 These benefits are likely to ensure 
sustainability once the public employers and employees adopt the safeguards. 
C. Process-Oriented Safeguards: Third Party Representative or Different 
Arbitration Focus  
Perhaps the strongest, most effective safeguards lie in the arbitral procedure itself. 
Arbitration provides benefits for both parties, including education experts in an expedient 
and private proceeding as an alternative to a public, potentially lengthy litigation.240 
Arbitration can continue to be an integral part of the public employer-employee labor 
relations but can be stronger if the arbitrator maintains children’s rights at the forefront in 
his or her analysis. Because the primary and secondary education field involves underage 
students, who are vulnerable and underdeveloped,241 the arbitration procedure should be 
                                                 
235 See generally Sch. Dist., 199 N.W.2d 752; N.J. Tpk. Auth., 670 A.2d 1 (discussing the importance of 
safeguarding the employer’s managerial prerogatives). 
236 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”). 
237 J. Ric Gass, Handling Sympathy in Jury Trials: Introduction, PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 455 at 37, 43 (1933).  
238 See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.08 (explaining the stakeholders’ desire for expedient, low-cost procedures). 
239 Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘Unfair’ Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 695, 751 (2001) (identifying 
certain characteristics particular arbitration: “ability to select the arbitrator, limited discovery, lack of an 
appeals process . . .”). While limited discovery does not mean that the parties will not be able to present their 
cases fully, limited discovery increases the likelihood that parties will not be able to present a piece of 
evidence the parties wanted to present.  
240 See Rapp, supra note 22, § 7.08. 
241 See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
wary of resolving disputes between public school employers and employees without 
considering children’s rights. Arbitration is typically included in CBAs as a final, binding, 
and preferred dispute resolution mechanism242 and arbitrators should take a strong stance 
for children’s rights because they may be the last arbiter standing between defenseless 
children in schools and educators who may be incapable of fostering a safe environment 
for the children.  
 This section presents two main options that would permit arbitrators to incorporate 
children’s rights to the forefront of their analysis when determining whether to reinstate an 
educator who has engaged in student-related misconduct. First, both parties can choose to 
include a third party representative to represent the students’ collective interests.  Because 
the third-party representative would represent all students collectively in the abstract, both 
the employer and employee would likely split the cost of retaining the third-party 
representative. One avenue for implementing this safeguard is to have an association or 
organization that represents the families, such as a parent-teacher association, choose the 
representative. The idea of having a third party represent children is not new. For example, 
in states across the United States, guardian ad litems often represent the best interests of 
the children in court proceedings involving children.243  
Second, the arbitrator can include the children’s well-being as an additional factor 
in his or her analysis. Adding an additional factor can occur in several ways. The arbitrator 
can derive its authority from the CBA to directly consider the students’ best interests.244 
This option requires that the public employer and employees include in the CBA the 
importance of considering the students’ best interests when determining whether to 
reinstate a teacher who has engaged in student-related misconduct.245 The arbitrator can 
also derive its authority to directly consider the students’ best interests if the school 
districts’ school codes and state statutes require that the arbitrator do so, as the state 
legislature has done in Massachusetts.246 Finally, the arbitrator can place a greater emphasis 
on children’s rights and their best interests when determining whether to reinstate a teacher 
who has engaged in student-related misconduct. An arbitrator may be more likely to 
consider whether the award will violate public policy because the arbitrator risks having a 
court vacate the award as a violation of public policy.247 When determining whether the 
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award violates public policy, the arbitrator has an opportunity to focus on the children’s 
rights, placing greater emphasis on the best interests of the students.  
1. Workability and Sustainability of the Process-Oriented Safeguards 
Both proposals are workable and sustainable, particularly when concerted efforts 
are in place. The first proposed safeguard, the addition of a third-party representative,  
presents more difficulty to implement than the latter safeguard, the arbitrators’ 
consideration of children’s rights as an additional factor during arbitral proceedings. 
Including a third-party representative will likely require additional costs in the arbitral 
proceedings, but the benefits of safeguarding the rights of students offset the costs. 
Additionally, both parties may divide the costs equally to decrease party expenses.  
A deeper issue with the addition of a third-party representative is the potential 
infringement on the parties’ autonomy and contractual relationships.248 A contractual 
relationship under a CBA includes only the employer and, collectively, the employees. 
Requiring a third party representative only during the arbitral proceeding in essence adds 
a non-signatory party to the contractual agreement. Such an addition may be problematic 
because parties who did not sign the contract did not partake in the bargaining process and 
did not agree to the final terms. However, the non-signatory party in this situation will 
participate in the arbitral proceeding and will likely offer viewpoints on the original CBA 
provisions. The parties may perceive the addition of the non-signatory party as an 
infringement of their autonomy to negotiate the CBA terms in accordance to their 
individual intents or objectives.  
Other questions may surge as well. For example, when should the parties decide 
who will serve as a third party representing the children’s interests? And, what role, if any, 
do the children have in deciding who represents their interests? As a starting point, school 
districts that choose to implement this safeguard can model the third party representative’s 
role after familiar roles, such as guardian ad litems who often represent the interests of 
children in court proceedings. School districts can also seek community input in order to 
adopt a safeguard supported by the district and families.  
The second safeguard, the arbitrator’s consideration of children’s rights as an 
additional factor during the arbitral proceeding, is a no-cost option that brings children’s 
rights to the forefront of the analysis. However, an arbitrator derives his or her authority 
from the CBA and is bound by statutory limitations.249 Hence, this second safeguard 
requires concerted efforts in order to remain sustainable. Concerted efforts may include, 
for example, that the states’ legislatures enact laws that require that the arbitrators consider 
children’s rights during arbitral proceedings.250 Other concerted efforts may also include 
that the public employers and employees indicate explicitly that they prefer that the 
arbitrators consider the children’s rights during arbitral proceedings. These efforts will 
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250 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (LexisNexis 2016). 
allow arbitrators to consider the children’s rights as an additional factor during the arbitral 
proceedings, while deriving the authority to do so from the CBA and within statutory 
limitations. If thoughtfully chosen and implemented, any of the safeguards can be workable 
and sustainable over time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Children’s rights have remained largely ignored in the public school labor relations 
context. Yet, children can be the vulnerable, third-party recipients of consequences 
following the reinstatement of an educator who engaged in student-related misconduct.251 
Public employee disciplinary matters may be arbitrable, allowing both the employer and 
employee to submit to final, binding arbitration. During the arbitration process, arbitrators 
often focus their analyses on the contractual language of the CBAs.252 If the arbitral awards 
come within the purview of the courts, the courts remain largely deferential toward these 
arbitral awards. The courts will likely consider whether the awards violate public policy 
but the analyses are rarely direct analyses of the children’s rights.253 Jurisdictions in which 
public employees’ disciplinary matters are arbitrable, should adopt legislative, judicial, 
employer-employee, and arbitration-process driven safeguards.254 These safeguards will 
help ensure that children’s rights remain at the forefront in the public school labor relations 
context when an educator has engaged in student-related misconduct.255 
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